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During the course of a single unemployment spell, the public employment service
(PES) often assigns an unemployed worker to a number of diﬀerent labour mar-
ket policies, such as monitoring and sanctions (e.g. in the form of meetings with
case workers), job search assistance, and diﬀerent activation programmes. Eﬃ-
cient construction of such combinations of policies requires knowledge of both the
combined eﬀect of certain policy packages and on the eﬀect of the individual policy
instruments. Using a Danish social experiment consisting of a combination of in-
tensive monitoring, job search assistance, and active labour market programmes,
we provide information on the eﬀects of the individual policy components using
only non-parametric methods. Even in a social experiment, inference on speciﬁc
policies implemented some time after randomisation is contaminated by dynamic
selection bias, and often parametric methods have been applied to circumvent
this problem. However, parametric methods are fundamentally in conﬂict with
the spirit of the experimental approach, which is to provide the required evidence
non-parametrically. Hence, the provision of non-parametric evidence of speciﬁc
policy instruments is the main contribution of our paper. This is of great policy
relevance, as it is crucial information to policy makers for designing labour market
policy packages that meet the aim of reducing structural unemployment rates in
a cost-minimizing way.
The experiment analyzed in this paper was conducted in two counties in Den-
mark during the winter of 2005-6. All individuals in the two counties who became
unemployed during this period were randomized into either a treatment or a control
group based on their birthday. The treated experienced a dramatic intensiﬁcation
of labour market policies in terms of early and mandatory participation in a job
search course, very frequent meetings with employment oﬃcers, and program par-
ticipation after a few months in open unemployment. The experimental protocol
dictated that these policies should be applied at speciﬁc unemployment durations.
We analyze the results from this experiment, and study both the overall eﬀect of
2the full treatment package, and the eﬀects of the individual sub-treatments: job
search assistance, monitoring, and (activation) program participation.
The overall eﬀect of the experiment requires identiﬁcation of the overall dif-
ference in the transition rate, whereas the eﬀect of the individual policies requires
identiﬁcation of the eﬀect on the conditional transition rate out of unemployment
during the speciﬁc week(s) when the speciﬁc policy is applied. Since the policies
were applied at pre-speciﬁed unemployment durations, individual policy eﬀects
can with some certainty be represented by the evolution of the treatment eﬀect
over the unemployment duration. As an illustration, say that one is interested in
the eﬀect of the experimental job search assistance program. One would then like
to compare the conditional transition rates out of unemployment for the treatment
and control group during the week(s) when the experimental protocol dictates that
job search assistance is taking place (and possibly the following weeks).
The distinction between the overall eﬀect and the eﬀects of the individual
policies gives rise to interesting identiﬁcation issues. The overall eﬀect could be
estimated by considering the eﬀect of the experiment on the cdf of the distribution
of the time to transition or its inverse, the quantile function. Graversen and van
Ours (2008a) provide Kaplan-Meier estimates on the eﬀect on the cdf (survival
function) for the Danish experiment considered in this paper. They ﬁnd that the
experiment had large positive eﬀects in terms of shorter average unemployment
duration. From the eﬀect on the cdf we cannot, however, obtain the eﬀect on
the conditional transition probabilities. This is because of the so-called dynamic
selection problem. Random assignment of treatment only ensures comparability
of the treatment and control groups at the time of randomisation. At later times
treated units with characteristics that have a positive/negative interaction eﬀect
with treatment on the transition probability leave the initial state ﬁrst/last, so
that these characteristics are under/over represented among the treated relative
to the controls, and this confounds the eﬀect of the treatment. For instance, up
until the time of the job search course, some individuals have left the treatment
3group and some have left the control group, such that the two groups are no longer
identical, and the randomisation imposed at the time of inﬂow to unemployment
is no longer present. In order to identify the eﬀect of the individual policies, one
would have to correct for this dynamic selection.
One approach to solve the dynamic selection problem is to rely on semi-
parametric models. As shown by Elbers and Ridder (1982) the Mixed proportional
hazard (MPH) model is semi-parametrically identiﬁed, so that if the multiplicative
structure is maintained, identiﬁcation does not rely on arbitrary functional form
or distributional assumptions. The parametric MPH model is used in Graversen
and van Ours (2008b) and Rosholm (2008) to estimate the eﬀects of the individual
sub-treatments used in the Danish experiment. Indeed, both studies conclude that
the meetings with caseworkers (or the perception that you had to meet with a case-
worker) were the most eﬀective among the speciﬁc policy instruments. However,
the estimated eﬀects of speciﬁc policy instruments are only valid if the parametric
assumptions underlying the model are correct. One may argue that in the case of
a social experiment, where the aim is to provide non-parametric evidence, para-
metric assumptions are especially troublesome. Ideally, we would prefer to rely
solely on the experimental variation to estimate the treatment eﬀects of interest.
In this study, we avoid parametric assumptions, by using newly developed non-
parametric methods by Ridder and Vikstr¨ om (2011). They derive non-parametric
bounds on the eﬀect on the conditional transition rate that are solely based on the
random assignment and not on arbitrary parametric assumptions. The bounds
provide the causal eﬀect on the conditional transition rate in each time period, i.e.
the evolution of the eﬀect of the experiment over unemployment duration. This
gives us information on the eﬀect of the individual labour market policies. Rid-
der and Vikstr¨ om (2011) also provide bounds under additional weak assumptions
that give more tightly identiﬁed bounds. We show that these bounds are highly
informative on the performance of the individual policies.
We ﬁnd interesting results. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of intensiﬁed job search
4assistance, frequent meetings with caseworkers, and pre-programme or threat ef-
fects of program participation. The bounds on the activation program eﬀect are
wide since the dynamic selection at that stage is large. We have also tested for
heterogeneous treatment eﬀects by age and sex. Considering the rather limited
experimental evidence on the performance of diﬀerent labour market policies these
results based on a social experiment provide important insights.1 In this respect
disentangling the eﬀects of the individual policies are important for designing the
most eﬃcient labour market policy package. Our results are also interesting since
’the Danish model’ for the labour market has received much attention lately, be-
cause of its perceived eﬀectiveness in maintaining high participation rates and low
unemployment rates. This successful performance is often attributed to the ’Flex-
icurity’ model, with ﬂexible hiring and ﬁring rules and regulations combined with
generous income transfer systems and very active labour market policies. In the
1980s, when unemployment rates were persistently high in Denmark, the ﬁrst two
components of the Flexicurity model - ﬂexibility and security - were already in
operation, but active labour market policies were only in its infant stages and not
nearly as intensive as they are today. Therefore, many have seen these intensive
policies as a pivotal component in the Flexicurity model (see e.g. Andersen and
Svarer, 2007). Our results provide non-parametric evidence to indicate that this
might indeed be the case.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows; sections 2 and 3 discuss
the Danish labour market and the social experiment. Section 4 presents the data
and provide descriptive statistics. In section 5 we discuss the problem of dynamic
selection and the methods we use to handle it. Section 6 presents the results and
section 7 concludes.
1The surveys in Kluve (2009) and Card et al. (2009) show that experimental evidence on
training programmes is scarce. Job search assistance and monitoring experiments have previously
been analyzed by e.g. Meyer (1995), Ashenfelter et al. (2005), Dolton and O´Neill (2002) and
Van den Berg and van der Klauuw (2006). Experimental evidence on pre-programme eﬀects are
found in Black et al. (2003) and H¨ agglund (2006).
52 The Danish labour market
The Danish labour market is highly organized in the sense that almost 80% of
workers are union members and members of an unemployment insurance fund,
giving them access to fairly generous UI beneﬁts should they become unemployed.
The remainder of workers are eligible for social welfare in case of unemployment
provided that they have no wealth to draw upon. Wage negotiation was decent-
ralized in the late 1980s and early 1990s, such that today mostly broad issues such
as minimum wage levels (and increases therein), hiring and ﬁring rules, holidays,
safety at work, etc., are centrally negotiated. This has resulted in a system where
there are quite low costs of labour turnover (hiring and ﬁring) but fairly gener-
ous income transfers to compensate the workers for income losses during periods
without work. Such a system is conducive to high rates of labour turnover, and
indeed nearly one quarter of the labour force switches jobs during any year (see
Frederiksen and Westergaard-Nielsen, 2007). In such a ﬂexible labour market, it is
important to have labour market policies in place that support the ability of work-
ers to make ﬂuent transitions between diﬀerent jobs. That is, the skill enhancing
and job search assistance components of labour market policies are quite import-
ant. The generous income transfer schemes (including UI beneﬁts) necessitate a
labour market policy which provides the unemployed with suﬃcient incentives to
search (given that replacement rates are quite large), thus emphasizing the im-
portance of frequent monitoring (of job search activities) and sanction policies, as
well as the importance of certain workfare arrangements to tax away some of the
leisure otherwise available to unemployed workers.
In many ways the Danish system for the labour market relies heavily upon the
eﬀectiveness of its labour market policies, and therefore experiments such as the
one analyzed here make up a crucial element in the collection of empirical evidence
on how to best design these policies.
63 The Experiment
The social experiment considered in this paper was carried out in the counties of
Southern Jutland and Storstrøm. Workers eligible for unemployment insurance
(UI) beneﬁts, who became unemployed during the period from November 1, 2005
to February 28, 2006, were randomly assigned into a treatment and a control
group. Those born on the 1st to the 15th were assigned to the treatment group,
while those born on the 16th to the 31st were assigned to the control group.2
Those in the treatment group received a letter after approximately 1.5 weeks
in open unemployment telling them about the new policy regime. They were not
told explicitly of the randomized experiment, rather they were told that they were
taking part in a ’pilot study’ regarding a new labour market policy regime. They
were also told about the contents of the new labour market policy regime. We
label the period before the letter as the pre-treatment regime, and the period after
the letter the new policy letter regime.
After 5-6 weeks of unemployment, those in the treatment group were supposed
to participate in a two-week Job Search Assistance (JSA) programme, intended to
determine the capabilities of the unemployed worker and helping her to search for
jobs. This is labeled the JSA programme regime. Thereafter, they should meet
frequently with a case worker in order to ensure that they are searching actively and
in order to assist them in their job search.3 There were three types of meetings;
1) job-plan meetings, during which an action plan for getting back to work is
formulated, 2) contact-meetings, in which the progress and job search strategies
of the unemployed worker are discussed, and ﬁnally 3) job assignment meetings,
during which the case worker informs the worker about an open vacancy.4 We
label this the frequent meetings regime.
2It was not possible to escape treatment by leaving unemployment for a short period, since
persons in the treatment group who return to unemployment during the period of the experiment
will enter the experiment at the stage where they left it.
3In the country of Southern Jutland, meetings would take place every fortnight, and in the
county of Storstrøm meetings would take place each week.
4Besides these meetings job interviews organized at a ﬁrm with a vacancy is registered as a
meeting, even if the case worker typically does not participate during the interview.
7Those who have not found employment after four months of unemployment
had to participate in an unspeciﬁed programme of at least three months’ duration.
Case workers had some discretion in how to allocate workers to programmes. There
were 5 types of programmes; the JSA programmes described above, private sector
temporary employment subsidy jobs, temporary employment within the public
sector, classroom training programmes ranging from IT courses to courses in brick-
laying, to truck drivers license courses, and ﬁnally vocational training programmes
in ﬁrms.
These programmes may have diﬀerent eﬀects. Full-time programme participa-
tion implies a great loss of utility from leisure. Some of the unemployed workers
may therefore perceive programme participation as a ’threat’, which gives them in-
centives to increase their job search eﬀorts prior to enrolment into the programme.
We therefore label the 3 weeks prior to program participation the pre-programme
regime. While enrolled, the unemployed have less time to search for employment,
in many cases leading to well documented lock-in eﬀects. If the programme is
successfully in providing the unemployed with new abilities, we expect a positive
eﬀect once programme participation is completed. In accordance, we label the ﬁrst
three weeks during which the unemployed is supposed to be in a programme as
the start programme regime, and the rest of the period in programmes as the later
programme regime. Finally, we label the period after programmes as the post-
treatment regime, since this also marks the end of the experiment and the return
of the treatment group to the ordinary labour market policy trajectory followed
by the control group.
Persons in the control group were subjected to the ordinary labor market policy
implying that they have to attend meetings with case workers once every three
months, and after one year of unemployment they are required to participate in
an unspeciﬁed program of unspeciﬁed duration. They had a right to participate in
a programme of their own choice for up to six weeks during the ﬁrst year in open
unemployment. The time span between the end of one programme and the start
8of the next after one year of unemployment should be shorter than six months.
The experiment thus involves eight diﬀerent treatment regimes, summarized
in table 1. Although the treatments are quite precisely deﬁned, as in all social
experiments there is still some scope for discretion by region and by case worker.
We also have to take into account that the control group outcomes are not the result
of non-treatment but rather of a diﬀerent, less intensive treatment. The exact
meeting intensities and programme participation intensities among the treatment
and control groups are analyzed in detail in Rosholm (2008). Here we present an
overview of the most important ﬁndings. Three points are important. First of all,
the activity level in terms of meetings and programme participation is considerably
higher in Storstrøm county than it is in Southern Jutland county. The general
pattern is that in Storstrøm county the experiment has been conducted more in line
with the experimental protocol, while in Southern Jutland, enforcement has been
more lax. There are, in essence, two diﬀerent experiments, one in each region, and
they should therefore be analyzed separately. Second, none of the counties come
close to the prescribed treatment intensities in the treatment group. For example,
in Storstrøm county the unemployed on average met with a case worker only every
2.5 weeks on average, where they should have done so each week. Third, even if
the activity intensities are lower than prescribed by the treatment protocol, the
increases in JSA, meetings, and programme participation starts at the prescribed
unemployment durations, and there are large diﬀerences in treatment intensities
between the treatment and control groups in both counties. This implies that we
can use the experimental protocol treatment regimes, but we have to keep in mind
that not everyone in the treatment group receives all treatments even if they stay
unemployed. We will therefore be estimating the intention-to-treat (ITT) eﬀects
of the experiment.
94 Data, sample selection, and descriptive stat-
istics
The data used for this study come from administrative databases used by the case
workers to register their dealings with the unemployed workers, from the central
register on the labour market (CRAM) that registers UI beneﬁt payments, and
various other administrative registers. All data are collected by The National
Labour Market Board and made available to the research community. The data
contain weekly information on the type of transfer received and the activities
undertaken in each week (meetings, programmes, etc.) for each worker.
The total inﬂow into open unemployment in the period between week 43 of
2005 and week 8 of 2006 was 5180 individuals. We remove individuals that are not
assigned correctly to the treatment and control groups based on an inspection of
their birthday as well as individuals who die or emigrate during the observation
period. The removal of the latter is done since we do not know the exact dates
of the events. We also remove individuals who do not receive any UI beneﬁts
during the ﬁrst six weeks of their unemployment spell. This is done because the
receipt of UI beneﬁts deﬁnes the unemployment spell. The reason for choosing a
six-week window is that we want to include persons who have just left education or
who have quit their job themselves, and these events involve a ﬁve-week sanction
period, in which the person may not receive UI beneﬁts.5
The resulting sample has 4513 individuals. In the sample selection process
we lose 15% in Southern Jutland county, and 12% in Storstrøm county. This is
mainly due to exclusion of non UI recipients. The fraction of removed treatments
and controls in Southern Jutland (Storstrøm) are 14.% and 15.7%, respectively
(10.5% and 11.2%), i.e. no remarkable diﬀerences. We therefore see no reason for
questioning the validity of the experiment.
5Some are unemployed due to ’bad weather’ and due to ’work-sharing arrangements’, and
since these categories of unemployed workers are not intended to take part in the experiment,
they are also removed from the sample.
10For each individual we determine the length of the unemployment spell that
triggered their participation in the experiment. The unemployment spell is con-
sidered to have ended when the individual has not received UI beneﬁts or some
related beneﬁt for more than four consecutive weeks. We divide the unemploy-
ment duration into eight intervals corresponding to the eight diﬀerent treatment
regimes discussed above. Besides the information used to construct unemployment
spells, the data contain some further information that may be used to construct
control variables, or, as in this paper, to estimate treatments eﬀects for diﬀerent
sub-populations. We have information on starting week, gender, age, ethnicity,
unemployment insurance fund membership, and fraction of time spent on public
income transfers during diﬀerent time spans before becoming unemployed.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables we exploit in this study,
age and gender, by region and treatment status. As expected, due to randomiz-
ation we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the treatment and control group
for these, nor for any of the possible control variables (see Rosholm, 2008). There
are, however, minor regional diﬀerences. Thus, the sample selection process does
not seem to have invalidated the experimental nature of the data.
5 Econometric speciﬁcation
5.1 The identiﬁcation problem
We are interested in estimating: (i) the combined eﬀect of the Danish experiment
policy package and (ii) the eﬀect of the individual monitoring, job search assistance
and programme policies. The overall eﬀect of the experiment requires identiﬁcation
of the overall diﬀerence in the transition rate or in other words the eﬀect on
the average unemployment duration, whereas the eﬀect of the individual policies
requires identiﬁcation of the eﬀect on the conditional transition rate at the speciﬁc
week when the policy is applied.
To be precise, what we are aiming to identify is the time pattern of the overall
11eﬀect of the experiment, which could be interpreted in terms of treatment regime
eﬀects. It will provide insightful information about the eﬀects of the individual
policies. In a strict sense there are, however, three potential limitations with this
approach. First, for all treatment regimes after the ﬁrst we can only hope to
estimate the eﬀect given that the individual already have been subject to earlier
treatments. Second, any important delayed eﬀects from previous treatments make
the interpretation of the later treatment regime eﬀects more diﬃcult. Third, the
experiment only provide information on the eﬀects of the individual policies given
at a particular week. However, given the quite limited experimental evidence
on the eﬀects of individual ALMP policies we are still conﬁdent that the time
pattern of the overall eﬀect provide very interesting insights into the eﬀects of the
individual ALMP policies.
More importantly, the distinction between the combined eﬀect and the eﬀect of
the individual policies gives rise to interesting identiﬁcation issues. In this subsec-
tion we describe and discuss these identiﬁcation issues in detail, using the familiar
Mixed Proportional Hazards (MPH) parametric model.6 In the next subsection we
then describe the non-parametric methods we use to address these identiﬁcation
problems.
In the case of a binary treatment the MPH model speciﬁes the individual hazard
or transition rate (t;d;V ) as
(t;d;V ) = (t)
(t)
dV;
with t the time spent in the origin state, (t), the baseline hazard, d, the treat-
ment indicator taking the value one if treated and zero otherwise, and V , a scalar
nonnegative unobservable that captures population heterogeneity in the transition
rate.
The nonnegative function 
(t) captures the eﬀect of the experiment at time
6The MPH model is a duration model for continuous time, whereas our outcome is discrete
with an exit in one of the eight treatment regimes. However, since the MPH model is so widely
used (see Van den Berg, 2001) we still use it as illustration of the identiﬁcation problem.
12point t. If applied to the experiment analyzed in this paper one could think about
the experiment as one overall treatment, and 
(t) as capturing the eﬀects of the
diﬀerent sub-treatments. For instance, during week 5-9, i.e. in the JSA treatment
regime, 
(t) captures the eﬀect of the JSA programme.
Deﬁne the time to transition T d. The MPH model implies that T d the haz-









Consider making a naive comparison of the transition rates for the non-treated
(t|d = 0) = (t)EV[V |T
0 ≥ t]
and the treated
(t|d = 1) = (t)
(t)EV[V |T
1 ≥ t]
Then, because most likely
EV[V |T
1 ≥ t] ̸= EV[V |T
0 ≥ t];
the eﬀect of the intervention on the transition rate is confounded by its diﬀerential
eﬀect on the distribution of the unobservable among the treated and controls. The
intuition behind this result is that the diﬀerence between the treated and control
transition rates is proportional in V , and this diﬀerence determines the survival
probability. If if 
(t) > 0 for all values of V , the survival probability is smaller
for the treated than for the controls and the diﬀerence is largest for large values
of V . Therefore the average V among the survivors will be smaller for the treated
than for the controls and this implies that the comparison of the average transition
rates of the treated and controls is confounded by this diﬀerence, which is labeled
dynamic selection. This dynamic selection or survivor bias is not just a feature
of the MPH model. It is present in any population where the treatment and the
13individual characteristics interact to increase or decrease the transition probability.
Parametric and semi-parametric models for the transition can be used to correct
for the survivor bias in the average treatment eﬀect. In a fully speciﬁed MPH
model, we specify a distribution for V , so that we can estimate EV [V |T 0 ≥ t] and
EV [V |T 1 ≥ t] to obtain the correction factor. However, such an approach requires
us to maintain the multiplicative speciﬁcation with a proportional unobservable.
As argued by e.g. Van den Berg (2001), economic models for the hazard rate
are typically not multiplicative. That is one reason why avoid functional form
assumptions.
5.2 Non-parametric bounds
The previous section showed that if we do not want to specify a model for the
transition rate we need to ﬁnd another way to maintain the comparability of the
treatment and control groups over the spell. The approach that we take in this
paper is to consider average transition rates, where the average is taken in the
same population for both treated and controls. We follow Ridder and Vikstr¨ om
(2011) (RV henceforth) and focus on additive average treatment eﬀects, where the
average is taken over the subpopulation of individuals who would have survived
until a certain time point in both the treatment and control group. The individuals
in this population have the same survival experience and any diﬀerence between
the transition rates must be due to the eﬀect of the treatment.
Our outcome of interest is the transition out of unemployment in either one
of the eight discrete treatment regime intervals. Formally, let the potential out-
come Y d
k be an indicator of a transition during treatment regime k if treatment is
assigned (d=1) or if no treatment (d=0) is assigned. Since there is only random-
ization at time of inﬂow to unemployment, the eﬀect of the intervention on the
transition rate in treatment regime k for the hypothetical subpopulation of indi-

























Following Rubin (2000), Abbring and van den Berg (2001) and RV, this can be
called the Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Survivors. Note that there is dynamic
selection and the ATESk controls for that by comparing the transition rates for
individuals with a common survival experience.
RV derive bounds on ATESk under sequential randomization. Sequential ran-
domization means that in each time period, a subset of the survivors up until this
period are randomized into treatment. The treatment assignment in the Danish
experiment is a special case of sequential randomization, where the probability to
be selected for treatment is zero in all time periods after the ﬁrst.
RV show that only certain ATESk eﬀects are point identiﬁed. From the expres-
sion above, this is directly apparent. In the ﬁrst treatment regime period there
are only survivors, so that the randomization ensures that ATES1 is point iden-
tiﬁed. For k > 1 this no longer holds, except in the special case when everyone
survives the ﬁrst k−1 periods. This means that ATESk for k > 1 cannot be point
identiﬁed.
Let Dk be the indicator that treatment is assigned in period k, and Yk the
observed outcome as an indicator of a transition in period k. Note that in our case
Dk = 0 for k > 1. Using the results in RV7 and imposing this restriction we have
7The only additional assumption we have to make is independent censoring. Deﬁne C as
the censoring time. Under independent censoring we e.g. have Pr(Y2 = 1|D1 = 1;Y1 = 0) =
Pr(C = 2)Pr(Y2 = 1|C = 2;D1 = 1;Y1 = 0) + Pr(C > 2)Pr(Y2 = 1|C > 2;D1 = 1;Y1 = 0) =
Pr(Y2 = 1|C > 2;D1 = 1;Y1 = 0), so that the average observed transition for the uncensored
observations could be used instead of the average transition rate for all individuals. Note that
the censoring rate is zero at week 20 and 1.4 % at week 30 (see Table 2). Given this and the fact
that the censoring rate is quite similar across the treatment and control groups we think that
this assumption is unproblematic.
15that the outcomes in the second treatment regime (k = 2) is bounded by8
max
{
[Pr(Y2 = 1|D1 = 1;Y1 = 0) − 1]Pr(Y1 = 0|D1 = 1)






Pr(Y2 = 1|D1 = 0;Y1 = 0)Pr(Y1 = 0|D1 = 0)






Pr(Y2 = 1|D1 = 1;Y1 = 0)Pr(Y1 = 0|D1 = 1)






[Pr(Y2 = 1|D1 = 0;Y1 = 0) − 1]Pr(Y1 = 0|D1 = 0)




Note that these bounds do not impose any assumptions beyond random assign-
ment. The bounds are sharp in the sense that there exist feasible joint distributions
of the potential outcomes which are consistent with the upper bound and the lower
bound. It gives an upper and lower value on the sub-treatment eﬀects that is con-
sistent with the available data and expressed in terms of transition probabilities
that are directly observable in the data. The above bounds are for the second
period, but bounds for later time periods follow the same pattern. The interested
reader is referred to RV for derivations and detailed expressions. The intuition
behind the bounds is that even if the data does not contain enough information
to point identify the treatment eﬀect of interest, the data often places an upper
bound on how much the dynamic selection can confound the treatment eﬀect of
interest.
Besides the general bounds that impose no assumptions beyond random as-
signment, RV also explore the identifying power of additional weak assumptions.
They show that weak assumptions may potentially tighten the bounds consider-
ably. We apply these bounds, but postpone the discussion of these assumptions
until section 6.3.




1 = 0];E[Y 00
2 |Y 1
1 = 0;Y 0
1 = 0] and ATES2 are not deﬁned.
166 Results
6.1 Overall eﬀect of the experiment
We ﬁrst present results on the overall eﬀect of the experiment. Table 2 presents
the mean unemployment duration for the control group and treatment group in
the two counties. Due to censoring of longer unemployment durations, we also
report the truncated mean duration (truncated after 280 days of unemployment).
These two measures produce very similar results. They show that the intensiﬁed
policies provided by the experiment on average reduce the time in unemployment
by about two weeks. It is the same result as in Graversen and Van Ours (2008a,
2008b) and Rosholm (2008).
The fact that intensiﬁed policies can reduce the time in unemployment is an
important result. However, from a policy perspective it is crucial to investigate
which one of the diﬀerent policies were (most) eﬀective, since the least eﬀective
may possibly be removed, and since they vary considerably in their costs, with the
meetings being by far the cheapest. In the next subsection we address this more
diﬃcult question using non-parametric methods.
6.2 Which policies work?
Tables 3 and 4 present the upper and the lower bound on ATESt for the diﬀerent
treatment regimes for Storstrøm and Southern Jutland county, respectively. 9 The
upper left panel of ﬁgures 1 and 2 display the same bounds. As implied by the
identiﬁcation results, the treatment eﬀect in the ﬁrst period is point identiﬁed.
As expected we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the control groups and
treatment groups in this pre-treatment regime period; it is before the treated
were informed about the new policy regime. For the other treatment regimes, the
bounds on the average treatment eﬀects are quite wide. For all of the following
treatment regimes we can neither rule out a positive nor a negative eﬀect of the
9Note that we do not report conﬁdence intervals. In principle these can be constructed using
the approach in Hahn and Ridder (2010).
17experiment. However, note that for some of the earlier treatment regimes the
bounds are nevertheless informative about the average treatment eﬀect. Still, we
must conclude that without further assumptions the experiment cannot inform us
which of the individual policies were the most eﬀective. Fortunately, RV provide
bounds under a couple of additional weak assumptions. In the next section, we
discuss these assumptions and present the bounds they deliver.
6.3 Weak assumption bounds
RV present results for three weak assumptions: monotone treatment response,
common shocks, and positively correlated outcomes. Here we provide an intuitive
discussion of these assumptions and refer to RV for an exact speciﬁcation of the
assumptions.
The assumption of a positively correlated outcomes (PCO) implies that some
unemployed individuals have a higher probability of ﬁnding employment compared
to other unemployed no matter whether they are in the control group or the
treatment group. This assumption is fulﬁlled if the ranking of the individuals in
terms of the characteristics that determines job oﬀers, such as experience and job
search eﬀort, stays the same during the entire job search period. More precisely, in
terms of the ALMP experiment the assumption means that the ALMP treatment
should not cause some individuals that quickly found a job without treatment
to suddenly slowly ﬁnd a job, and vice versa. We see no important reasons to
why there should be such ﬂipping behavior, especially since we are focusing on
relatively short unemployment durations (less than 40 weeks).
The common shocks (CS) assumption is related to the way duration models are
formulated. There are two pieces of information that determines if an individual
leaves unemployment in a certain time period: the individual transition rate and
a person-speciﬁc shock that determines if the transition is realized or not for that
person. As illustration, one individual may be likely to leave in a certain period,
but draws a negative shock and by chance ﬁnds no employment, and another
18individual may be unlikely to leave in a certain time period but is lucky and draws a
positive shock and thus ﬁnds employment anyway. One reason for why the general
bounds are wide is that they allow for diﬀerent shocks under treatment and under
no treatment. In the unemployment example in this paper this means that the
treatment not only systematically alters the transition rate out of unemployment
but also aﬀects the random events that determines if a transition is realized or
not. For the Danish ALMP experiment for unemployed it is diﬃculty to see why
this should be the case. The shocks assumption on the other hand means that
the individual is exposed to exactly the same shock under both treatment and no
treatment. We see no reason for doubting the validity of this assumption.
The monotone treatment response (MTR) assumption has been explored by
e.g. Manski (1997) and Manski and Pepper (2000). In a transition framework
one could formulate several diﬀerent kinds of MTR assumptions. In this paper we
make the same assumption as in RV. That is that the treatment eﬀect either is
positive or negative for all individuals in all time periods. It means that we do
not assume a speciﬁc direction for the treatment eﬀects, only that the direction is
the same for all individuals. For that reason we do not ﬁnd the assumption to be
very restrictive. Also, note that it is considerably weaker than the assumption of
constant treatment eﬀect made in the MPH model.
The results exploring these assumptions are presented in tables 3 and 4, and are
displayed in ﬁgure 1 and 2. These bounds are for the additive eﬀect of the treat-
ment regime on the transition probability during the treatment regime. Hence, the
bounds are not transformed to a ’per week’ eﬀect on the transition probability.
It is immediately apparent that these weak assumptions tighten the bounds
considerably. In fact for the most restrictive speciﬁcation using all three assump-
tions we are able to bound the eﬀect away from zero (in the positive direction)
for many treatment regimes. Consider the eﬀects of the experiment in Storstrøm
county, reported in table 3. In the six ﬁrst treatment regimes we ﬁnd positive
eﬀects of the experiment on the transition rate to unemployment, and in the 3rd
19to the 6th treatment regime, the lower bounds are considerably larger than zero.
These regimes are the JSA programmes, frequent meetings, pre-programme and
start programme.
Hence, in Storstrøm county, where the treatment protocol was followed most
strictly, we conclude that the overall positive eﬀects of the experiment is a com-
bined eﬀect of several sub-treatments. Hence, a range of diﬀerent policies contrib-
ute to the decrease in the time spent unemployed. Namely, including job search
courses (carrots) and frequent meetings, which may both have a monitoring (stick)
component and a job search assistance (carrot) component. The positive eﬀects
shortly before and in the early phases of programme participation further suggests
the presence of a threat eﬀect of future and present programme participation. We
should also point out that the bounds for the later programme regime and the
post treatment regime are quite wide even for this more restrictive speciﬁcation.
In fact, we cannot rule out very large positive nor small negative eﬀects after the
programme has ended. This is because at this later stage the dynamic selection
implied is potentially severe.
The results from the experiment in Southern Jutland are slightly less clear
cut. For the most restrictive speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd that the lower bounds for JSA
programmes and the frequent meetings are larger than zero, indicating positive
eﬀects on the transition rate out of unemployment. For the subsequent treatment
regimes the lower bounds are all positive but very close to zero. The slightly more
uncertain bounds for Southern Jutland county is most likely a consequence of the
less strict adherence to the treatment protocol.
The overall conclusion that stands out from this analysis of the bounds of the
treatment regimes is that JSA courses and frequent meetings with case workers
certainly have positive eﬀects on transition probabilities out of unemployment,
while pre-programme and early programme treatment regimes (threat eﬀects of
programmes) have positive eﬀects in one region and possibly has so in the other
region as well. Later eﬀects are more diﬃcult to assess due to the extent of dynamic
20selection at these stages.
6.4 Heterogeneous eﬀects
We now test for important heterogeneous eﬀects by gender and by age (less than 40
and 40 or above). We provide bounds under the combined assumption of positively
correlated outcomes, monotone treatment responses and common shocks.
The results for the two counties are presented in table 5 and 6. There are
no clear patterns that stand out for both regions. Still, there are interesting
results, nevertheless. In Storstrøm county, there are large (coeﬃcient larger than
0.05) positive eﬀects of the new policy letter, of the frequent meetings and of
the pre-programme regime for women, while only the JSA programme gave large
positive eﬀects for men. In Southern Jutland county, there are only large positive
eﬀects of the JSA programme for women, while for men, there are large positive
eﬀects of the JSA programme, the frequent meetings, and the pre-programme
regime, i.e. almost exactly the opposite from Storstrøm. The diﬀerences in the
treatments in the two regions is ﬁrst that in Storstrøm, meetings were every week,
while in Southern Jutland they only took place one every fortnight. This may
seem innocuous, but a recent social experiment investigating speciﬁc treatments
in separate experiments ﬁnd precisely that women react to meetings while men
react to programme threats, see Rosholm et al. (2010). The results presented here
are not in disagreement with such an interpretation.
Splitting the samples by age, we ﬁnd that in Storstrøm, there are large pos-
itive eﬀects of JSA programmes, frequent meetings, and pre-programme regimes
for those aged below 40, likely the more mobile part of the labour force. These
treatments have no strong eﬀects for older workers. For Southern Jutland county,
the results are less clear cut in this dimension.
Summing up, there is a tendency that meetings are more likely to have positive
eﬀects for women, while a policy mix relying more heavily on the programme
components tend to produce larger eﬀects for men. Moreover, if anything, eﬀects
21appear to be slightly larger for the younger age group.
7 Conclusion and policy discussion
In this paper, we have used non-parametric techniques to make inference on treat-
ment eﬀects of speciﬁc policies applied sequentially to unemployed workers in a
social experiment. The dynamic selection problem, which is normal dealt with by
resorting to distributional assumptions and parametric or semi-parametric models,
is dealt with by providing bounds on the treatment eﬀects. Adding a few fairly
weak assumptions, the bounds narrow considerably, allowing us to infer that some
of the speciﬁc treatments had positive eﬀects.
Speciﬁcally, the social experiment was one where active labour market policies
were applied very early during the unemployment spell and at an intensive rate.
We ﬁnd that the overall policy package reduced unemployment duration by about
two weeks, and that job search assistance, frequent meetings, and threat eﬀects
associated with perceived future programme participation have signiﬁcant positive
eﬀects on the transition probability out of unemployment. The Danish Economic
Council (2007) perform a cost-beneﬁt analysis of the experiment and show that the
overall package led to a net beneﬁt of e2000 per fresh unemployment spell, mostly
due to the increase in production associated with the shortening of unemployment
spells.
Given that a meeting is the cheapest policy instrument (a meeting of an average
duration of half an hour has marginal costs of approximately e23 per week for
weekly meetings) and that meetings appear to have consistently positive eﬀects,
particularly for women, that begs the case for frequent meetings between case
workers and clients for newly unemployed workers, especially women.
Job search courses also showed positive eﬀects, but as they are more expensive
(on average e200 in operating costs per participant per week, excluding the UI
beneﬁts they will get whether they participate or not), the case for job search
22courses is considerable weaker. Moreover, the policy of frequent meetings has not
been subjected to a general equilibrium analysis, and the assumption of no impact
on other unemployed workers might be problematic. See, however, Gautier et al.
(2010) for an equilibrium analysis on the same data suggesting that there are no
general equilibrium eﬀects of the experiment.
Longer lasting programme participation gives rise to a threat eﬀects but is
also quite costly, since the average cost is around e200 per participant per week,
excluding UI beneﬁts. Nevertheless, if suﬃciently many unemployed workers are
pushed into employment before programme start or in the early phases of the
programme, such policies might be worthwhile.
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26Tables and Figures
Table 1: Treatment regimes
Treatment regime: Weeks
1 1-2 Pre-treatment
2 3-4 New policy letter
3 5-9 JSA programme
4 10-15 Frequent meetings
5 16-18 Pre-programme
6 19-22 Start programme
7 23-30 Later programme
8 31-39 Post-treatment
27Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Storstrøm county Southern Jutland county
Treatment Control Treatment Control
Observations 1174 1219 1055 1065
Unemployment duration
Unemployment duration 14.80 16.72 15.63 17.52
Truncated duration 14.60 16.52 15.44 17.26
Raw transition rate
Period 1 0.087 0.095 0.085 0.092
Period 2 0.105 0.128 0.106 0.095
Period 3 0.233 0.289 0.217 0.290
Period 4 0.283 0.326 0.257 0.318
Period 5 0.174 0.242 0.175 0.204
Period 6 0.189 0.243 0.188 0.196
Period 7 0.278 0.242 0.259 0.275
Period 8 0.184 0.121 0.117 0.167
Censoring
within 20 weeks 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
within 30 weeks 0.008 0.023 0.011 0.017
within 40 weeks 0.097 0.129 0.102 0.140
Total 0.144 0.180 0.152 0.217
Gender
Male 0.62 0.60 0.54 0.54
Female 0.38 0.40 0.46 0.46
Age group
Less than 24 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.13
25-29 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14
30-39 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.24
40-49 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.25
50-59 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.22
60 and above 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
28Table 3: Bounds on treatment regime eﬀects for Storstrøm.
NO [1] MTR+CS [2]
Treatment regime: Weeks LB UB LB UB
1. Pre-treatment 1-2 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
2. New policy letter 3-4 -0.082 0.140 0.022 0.030
3. JSA programme 5-9 -0.240 0.376 0.047 0.082
4. Frequent meetings 10-15 -0.942 0.974 0.011 0.126
5. Pre-programme 16-18 0.035 0.222
6. Start programme 19-22 -0.002 0.243
7. Later programme 23-30 -0.143 0.241
8. Post-treatment 31-39 -0.121 0.121
PCO [3] MTR+CS+PCO [4]
Treatment regime: Weeks LB UB LB UB
1. Pre-treatment 1-2 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
2. New policy letter 3-4 -0.070 0.126 0.023 0.030
3. JSA programme 5-9 -0.128 0.287 0.055 0.082
4. Frequent meetings 10-15 -0.283 0.326 0.043 0.126
5. Pre-programme 16-18 -0.174 0.242 0.068 0.222
6. Start programme 19-22 -0.189 0.243 0.053 0.243
7. Later programme 23-30 -0.278 0.242 -0.036 0.241
8. Post-treatment 31-39 -0.184 0.121 -0.063 0.121
Notes: Number of observations are 2393. NO indicates the bounds under random assignment.
MTR stands for assumption monotone treatment response, CS common shocks, and PCO
positively correlated outcomes.
29Table 4: Bounds on treatment regime eﬀects for Southern Jutland.
NO [1] MTR+CS [2]
Treatment regime: Weeks LB UB LB UB
1. Pre-treatment 1-2 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
2. New policy letter 3-4 -0.115 0.099 -0.012 -0.003
3. JSA programme 5-9 -0.189 0.372 0.070 0.074
4. Frequent meetings 10-15 -0.736 0.828 0.035 0.134
5. Pre-programme 16-18 -0.005 0.191
6. Start programme 19-22 -0.037 0.196
7. Later programme 23-30 -0.049 0.204
8. Post-treatment 31-39 0.017 0.167
PCO [3] MTR+CS+PCO [4]
Treatment regime: Weeks LB UB LB UB
1. Pre-treatment 1-2 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
2. New policy letter 3-4 -0.104 0.089 -0.011 -0.003
3. JSA programme 5-9 -0.103 0.264 0.070 0.073
4. Frequent meetings 10-15 -0.257 0.318 0.061 0.134
5. Pre-programme 16-18 -0.175 0.204 0.029 0.191
6. Start programme 19-22 -0.188 0.196 0.008 0.196
7. Later programme 23-30 -0.259 0.275 0.017 0.204
8. Post-treatment 31-39 -0.117 0.167 0.050 0.167
Notes: Number of observations are 2120. NO indicates the bounds under random assignment.
MTR stands for assumption monotone treatment response, CS common shocks, and PCO
positively correlated outcomes.
30Table 5: Heterogenous treatment regime eﬀects for Storstrøm.
Men [1] (N=934) Women [2] (N=1459)
Treatment regime: Weeks LB UB LB UB
1. Pre-treatment 1-2 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007
2. New policy letter 3-4 -0.011 -0.005 0.042 0.049
3. JSA programme 5-9 0.068 0.072 0.041 0.084
4. Frequent meetings 10-15 0.014 0.082 0.065 0.147
5. Pre-programme 16-18 0.035 0.128 0.105 0.299
6. Start programme 19-22 0.040 0.170 0.078 0.312
7. Later programme 23-30 -0.023 0.133 -0.052 0.255
8. Post-treatment 31-39 -0.067 0.076 -0.053 0.147
Young < 40 [3] (N=1200) OLD > 40 [4] (N=1193)
Treatment regime: Weeks LB UB LB UB
1. Pre-treatment 1-2 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.010
2. New policy letter 3-4 -0.001 0.005 0.047 0.057
3. JSA programme 5-9 0.070 0.074 0.042 0.095
4. Frequent meetings 10-15 0.065 0.145 0.025 0.115
5. Pre-programme 16-18 0.091 0.241 0.047 0.180
6. Start programme 19-22 0.030 0.250 0.074 0.232
7. Later programme 23-30 -0.083 0.212 0.001 0.255
8. Post-treatment 31-39 -0.153 0.054 0.003 0.144
Notes: N is the number of observations. Bounds under monotone treatment response, common
shocks and positively correlated outcomes.
31Table 6: Heterogenous treatment regime eﬀects for Southern Jutland.
Men [1] (N=973) Women [2] (N=1147)
Treatment regime: Weeks LB UB LB UB
1. Pre-treatment 1-2 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.014
2. New policy letter 3-4 0.013 0.013 -0.031 -0.018
3. JSA programme 5-9 0.057 0.069 0.074 0.087
4. Frequent meetings 10-15 0.093 0.163 0.025 0.102
5. Pre-programme 16-18 0.062 0.183 -0.018 0.100
6. Start programme 19-22 0.006 0.152 0.002 0.099
7. Later programme 23-30 0.026 0.248 -0.008 0.081
8. Post-treatment 31-39 0.054 0.143 0.028 0.126
Young < 40 [3] (N=1132) OLD > 40 [4] (N=988)
Treatment regime: Weeks LB UB LB UB
1. Pre-treatment 1-2 0.014 0.014 -0.001 -0.001
2. New policy letter 3-4 -0.012 0.002 -0.011 -0.010
3. JSA programme 5-9 0.082 0.084 0.053 0.062
4. Frequent meetings 10-15 0.050 0.139 0.071 0.125
5. Pre-programme 16-18 0.040 0.205 0.018 0.166
6. Start programme 19-22 0.043 0.217 -0.027 0.139
7. Later programme 23-30 -0.042 0.199 0.074 0.202
8. Post-treatment 31-39 0.016 0.157 0.080 0.176
Notes: N is the number of observations. Bounds under monotone treatment response, common
shocks and positively correlated outcomes.
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